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ABSTRACT
Moral rights are often portrayed as an unwelcome import into U.S.
law. During the nineteenth century, European lawmakers, influenced by
personality theories of authorship, began granting authors rights of
attribution and integrity. However, while these rights proliferated in
Europe and international copyright treaties, they were not adopted in the
United States. According to a common historical narrative, U.S. courts
and lawmakers resisted moral rights because they were deemed
incompatible with the copyright tradition of treating expressive works as
alienable property. What little moral rights U.S. law provides today is
thus seen as a necessary evil, grudgingly accepted, simply to comply with
international obligations.
This Article presents a history of moral rights protection that
challenges, to a degree, that common historical narrative. The Article
tracks how American courts adjudicated attribution and integrity disputes
during the twentieth century. Doing so not only reveals that the American
judiciary was more sympathetic to these claims than commonly
appreciated, but, even more surprisingly, came close to developing a tort
of moral rights invasion. While copyright historians know that courts have
long provided proxy protection for moral rights under preexisting
common law causes of action (e.g., defamation, unfair competition,
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privacy, etc.), what is not widely known is how frequently courts were
willing to protect attribution and integrity interests directly under the
banner of moral rights. This Article tells the story of how courts in the
mid-twentieth century, applying state law, increasingly articulated a “sui
generis tort” of moral rights invasion. It then proceeds to question why
the moral rights tort stagnated and was forgotten about in the late
twentieth century.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes said that moral rights protection is an unwelcome
import into U.S. law. Moral rights first appeared in civil law countries in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At this time, European
lawmakers, influenced by “personality theories” of authorship and a
desire to preserve culturally important artworks, began to bestow upon
authors legal entitlements to claim authorship and to police the artistic
integrity of their creative works. 1 But while these rights proliferated in
other countries and in international copyright treaties, they were resisted
within the United States. According to a common historical narrative,
American lawmakers in the twentieth century refused to protect authorial
moral rights for two related reasons: first, allowing authors to retain
personal rights in the creative work after sale would conflict with
copyright’s status as an alienable property right; and second, protecting
authorial attribution and integrity interests was seen as incompatible with
the utilitarian purpose of U.S. copyright. 2 Today, while the United States
provides some minimal moral rights protection, through sources of law
such as the Visual Artist’s Rights Act, it does so only to superficially
comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention. “Grudgingly
accepted,” 3 moral rights serve merely as “legal fig leaves,” 4 allowing the
United States to satisfy its international obligations.
This Article presents a history of moral rights development in the
United States that, to a degree, challenges the common historical
* Qualcomm Fellow, Harvard Law School. The author is grateful to Amy Adler, Oren Bracha, John
C.P. Goldberg, Bharath Palle, Henry Smith, participants at the Fourth Annual David and Ann Brennan
IP Scholarship Forum at University of Akron School of Law, participants of Boston University
Intellectual Property Speaker Series, and the editors of the Akron Law Review, for their comments
and suggestions on this Article.
1. See ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS 9-97
(2006); PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC BATTLE
126-98 (2014).
2. See generally BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 8-9, 44-47.
3. Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 266 (2012).
4. BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 20.
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narrative. The Article tracks how American courts adjudicated attribution
and integrity disputes during the twentieth century. Doing so reveals that
the American judiciary was more sympathetic to authorial claims than is
commonly appreciated. The most interesting finding is that U.S. courts
applying state common law came surprisingly close to developing a
unique tort of moral rights invasion. While copyright lawyers are aware
that courts have long protected attribution and integrity interests under
preexisting causes of action (such as unfair competition, privacy, and
defamation), 5 what is not generally known is how frequently judges were
willing to protect these interests directly under the banner of moral rights.
In 1940, in the Harvard Law Review, Martin Roeder wrote that courts not
only protected attribution and integrity interests under familiar causes of
action, but also that there was “some groping towards an inarticulate, sui
generis tort theory” of moral rights invasion. 6 As the Article highlights,
this “groping” intensified from 1940 to 1980, with a high-water mark in
the 1970s. During this period, courts, struggling to accommodate
conflicting values, were on a path to developing an indigenous,
homegrown, and distinctly American version of moral rights. After 1980,
however, the judicial development of the moral rights tort stagnated and
stalled. But the story of the lost tort of moral rights remains; and the story
should provoke copyright lawyers to question some of the rhetoric
surrounding American moral rights today. The reception of the moral
rights concept in U.S. law was more complex, more favorable, and far less
one-dimensional than sometimes portrayed.
Section II describes the cases on moral rights throughout the
twentieth century. It tells the story of how U.S. courts came close to
developing a unique moral rights cause of action, and how that movement
withered after 1980. Section III speculates about why this movement
fizzled out in the late twentieth century. Section IV concludes with a brief
reflection on the importance of the lost tort to today’s debates about
American moral rights.

5. See, e.g., Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513 (1986); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the
Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229 (1995);
BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 226-27.
6. Martin Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 575 (1940).
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II. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
A.

Pre-1940

From the late nineteenth century up to the early 1940s courts,
applying state common law, provided some protection for attribution and
integrity interests. The terms “moral rights” and “droit moral” were not
used, having not yet entered into widespread legal consciousness.
However, courts did not merely apply existing common law causes of
action. As Roeder later claimed, there was a groping toward a sui generis
tort theory of moral rights protection during this time period. 7 While
courts frequently employed familiar causes of action such as libel, unfair
competition, and privacy to protect authorial interests, 8 there was also a
string of cases that singled out authorial interests as a separate legal
category requiring unique rules and treatment.
Arguably the most famous case—although by no means the
clearest—from this era is Clemens v. Press Publishing Co. 9 In 1909,
author William M. Clemens 10 offered to sell the defendant publishers a
manuscript, which he claimed successfully solved a recent murder case
(that of Hazel Drew11). The defendants agreed to buy the manuscript,
provided it was shortened, and to publish it in the New York World
newspaper. 12 In exchange for the story, the defendants promised to pay
$200 and to deliver 25 galley-proof copies to the plaintiff. 13 Clemens
dutifully reduced the length of the story and delivered the modified
manuscript to the defendants. At which point, the question arose whether
the story would be published under the plaintiff’s name. 14 The defendants
refused to publish Clemens’s name, while Clemens refused to allow the

7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g, 251 N.Y. 250 (1929); Ellis v. Hurst, 128 N.Y.S. 144
(App. Div. 1910); Harte v. De Witt, reported in Rights in Literary Property, 1 CENTRAL L.J. 360
(1874).
9. 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910).
10. Nephew of Samuel L. Clemens (aka Mark Twain), see Obituaries, TRENTON EVENING
TIMES (Nov. 25, 1931). He was born in Paris, Ohio and attended Buchtel College, which is now The
University of Akron. See RON HUGHES, WHO KILLED HAZEL DREW? UNRAVELING CLUES TO THE
TRAGIC MURDER OF A PRETTY SERVANT GIRL (2017).
11. The unsolved murder of Hazel Drew reportedly later inspired the 1990s television drama,
Twin Peaks. See David Bushman & Mark Givens, Hazel’s brutal murder was all but forgotten. Until
she inspired ‘Twin Peaks,’ THE WASH. POST (May 11, 2017).
12. The New York World had a reputation for sensationalism and “yellow journalism.” See
GEORGE JUERGENS, JOSEPH PULITZER AND THE NEW YORK WORLD 43-92 (1966).
13. Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 207.
14. Id.
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publication to go ahead without receiving credit. 15 In response, the
publisher refused to publish and refused to pay the $200. 16 Clemens sued
in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, but his complaint was
dismissed on the merits at the end of trial. Clemens appealed to the
Supreme Court of New York where he was successful, 17 although the
reasoning of the court is far from clear. Two judges—Seabury and
Gavegan—upheld Clemens’s claim while one judge—Lehman—
dissented. 18 While Lehman found the contract had been rescinded once
the dispute arose, and had nothing to say about moral rights, both Seabury
and Gavegan discussed Clemens’s attribution interest. 19
Gavegan was skeptical of Clemens’s attribution claim. Gavegan
viewed the matter as purely about the sale of property. 20 The parties had
successfully transferred property in the manuscript, he claimed. 21 Once
Clemens delivered the writing and title vested in the publishers, all that
remained was for the defendant to pay Clemens the agreed price. The
defendant, having taken title of the manuscript, could do as it pleased with
the work; the defendant could choose to publish it, or not publish, with or
without the plaintiff’s name. 22 The “wishes of the plaintiff after parting
with the title in the property may betray the eccentricities of the author,”
Gavegan wrote, “but they have no greater weight in law than the wishes
of a stranger to the transaction after it was consummated.” 23 Nevertheless,
the fact that the defendant had not paid Clemens the agreed price meant
that the plaintiff deserved relief and the trial court judgment was reversed
with a new trial ordered. 24
Seabury, by contrast, supported the author’s right to be named as the
author. In a passage that would subsequently be quoted frequently,
Seabury found that “[e]ven the matter of fact attitude of the law does not
require us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary production in the
same way we would consider the sale of a barrel of pork.” 25 Unlike the
sale of pork, the author retains some rights in the manuscript even after
sale. 26 The buyer in such cases “cannot make as free a use of [the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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See id.
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Id. (Seabury, J., concurring).
Id. at 207-08.
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manuscript] as he could of the pork which he purchased” in absence of a
contract permitting such uses. 27 In particular, the purchaser “cannot garble
[the work], or put it out under another name than the author’s; nor can he
omit altogether the name of the author, unless his contract with the latter
permits him so to do.” 28 The reason, Seabury provided, was that the
author’s reputation and standing, and thus his earning capacity, was
affected by whether the work was published under his name or not. 29 In
the present case, there was no reason to believe Clemens had contracted
away his right to naming credit. Rather, Seabury found that the parties
intended that the author’s name would appear on the work, based on the
fact that the defendant had accepted the work with the plaintiff’s name
upon it, and that the defendant had provided the plaintiff with 25 galley
proofs of the work, each bearing the plaintiff’s name. 30
Another interesting attribution case from the period is Jones v.
American Law Book Co. 31 Basil Jones was hired to write articles on law
for publication by the American Law Book Co. 32 One such article Jones
wrote was called Army and Navy, to be published in the defendant’s
Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure. 33 Jones objected to the defendant’s
publication of his article without his name. 34 He based his claim for relief
on, first, that the custom in publishing legal encyclopedias was to publish
the author’s name, and second, that “irrespective of any custom or usage
the right of an author to the public credit of his work and to the publication
of his name in connection therewith is inherent and resides in him until
waived or surrendered.” 35 The trial court judge agreed with this claim.

27. Id. at 208.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 125 A.D. 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908). The case was apparently not the first controversy to
arise between the parties, see Hughes v. Jones, 81 N.Y.S. 1131 (App. Div. 1903).
32. Jones, 125 A.D. at 519.
33. Id.
34. It is hard to say whether this was a case of non-attribution or of false attribution. According
to the appellate court decision, written by Judge Houghton, “the only statement as to the authorship”
was a “statement that it was edited by Henry A. Sharpe, Associate Justice Supreme Court of
Alabama.” Jones, 125 A.D. at 520. Additionally, Houghton wrote that Basil Jones sued in order to
have his name “substituted as author.” Richard Roger Bowker’s copyright treatise also reports that
not only was Basil Jones’s name removed, but it was “replaced by that of a distinguished jurist.”
RICHARD ROGER BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: IT’S HISTORY AND IT’S LAW 100 (1912). It is unclear
whether readers would have believed Sharpe to be the author (in which situation the case resembles
more of a false attribution fact pattern), or whether they would have understood from the statement
that Sharpe was editing the work of some other uncredited person (a case more akin to nonattribution).
35. Jones, 125 A.D. at 520 (citing the opinion of the trial court below).
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Judge McCall reasoned that the common law protected the author’s right
to decide whether to publish the work, and in what form such first
publication would take place. 36 As this was the first publication of Jones’s
article, he had the right to decide whether its form would include his name
or not. Furthermore, while the contract between Jones and the American
Law Book Co. allowed the latter to edit the work, McCall found no reason
to believe the right had been waived in the contract. 37
However, McCall’s judgment was reversed on appeal. 38 According
to Judge Houghton, a reasonable interpretation of the employment
contract permitted the defendant to omit Jones’s name. 39 Houghton found
that Jones entered into the defendant’s employment, wherein he would
work for a certain number of hours per day preparing and writing
articles. 40 Furthermore, Houghton concluded that Jones, via contract,
permitted the defendant to edit the articles “in any manner [that] the
defendant desired.” 41 The right to have his name appear on the article was
not reserved in the contract. 42 But Houghton also suggested that the
“character of the work and the manner in which [the] plaintiff” was
employed were also significant.43 Houghton distinguished the Jones case
from the situation wherein an author is retained “to write a book or a
play.” 44 In the latter case, the contract could be read as “contemplating
that the author should have his name appear, and thus enjoy whatever
reputation the learning or brilliancy of the work might give him . . . .” 45
Houghton thus concluded that Jones had waived whatever right to
attribution he initially may have enjoyed, and furthermore that this was
not the type of case wherein it might be presumed that the parties had
implicitly agreed to reserve the author’s right to attribution.46
Arguably, courts were willing to provide even greater protection in
cases of false attribution (i.e., either where the author’s name was
erroneously placed upon the work of another person, or when an author’s
work was incorrectly attributed to someone else). In the Mark Twain
36. Id.
37. Id. (“It is true that [Jones] stipulated that whatever he produced should be submitted to a
process of editing, but it would be a wide stretch of the imagination that would work out of that
proposition a sale or waiver of his rights to ownership to or credit for the results of his labor.”).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 521.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Casea case in which Samuel Clemens tried to restrain a defendant from
printing uncopyrighted short stories previously published by
Clemensthe court wrote (as obiter dictum) that “an author of acquired
reputation, and, perhaps, a person who has not obtained any standing
before the public as a writer, may restrain another from the publication of
literary matter purporting to have been written by him, but which, in fact,
was never so written.” 47 This dictum was subsequently relied upon in
Packard v. Fox Film Corp., a case in which the plaintiff, Frank L. Packard,
sold to Fox the right to transform his story (The Iron Rider) into a movie,
but where Fox proceeded to use the title of the story and the plaintiff’s
name in connection with an entirely different story. 48 The Supreme Court
of New York found that the plaintiff had a property right in his work, and
that the defendants exceeded the rights they had acquired in the work. 49
The same conclusion was reached in Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors,
Inc. 50 In that case, famous adventure novelist James Oliver Curwood
contracted with Affiliated Distributors to make a movie adaptation of his
story, The Poetic Justice of Uko San.51 However, he successfully
restrained distribution of the resulting motion picture on the grounds the
defendants had used Curwood’s name and the manuscript’s title on a
movie (I Am the Law) that told a “wholly different story” to that of Poetic
Justice. 52 District Judge Knox found this actionable as it “injures [the

47. Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 731 (Ill. Cir. Ct. N.D. 1883). The quote
continues:
In other words, no person has the right to hold another out to the world as the author of
literary matter which he never wrote; and the same rule would undoubtedly apply in favor
of a person known to the public under a nom de plume, because no one has the right, either
expressly or by implication, falsely or untruly to charge another with the composition or
authorship of a literary production which he did not write.
Id.
48. 202 N.Y.S. 164 (App. Div. 1923).
49. Id. at 165. The Harvard Law Review agreed with the conclusion, but reasoned slightly
differently. In Recent Cases, 37 HARV. L. REV. 776 (1923-24), the Review authors agreed that the
“law recognizes not only the desire of an author to preserve a marketable reputation, but his pride of
literary paternity as well.” But rather than tie this to a property theory, the Review found that both
property and personal rights were violated by the defendant’s conduct. Id.
50. 283 F. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
51. Id.
52. Id. However, it is worth noting that while the movie, I Am the Law, did not faithfully
represent the Poetic Justice story, it did still, on some level, reflect James Oliver Curtis’s work. The
defendants’ movie was later found to be an infringing adaptation of another Curwood novel, called
The Valley of Silent Men. See Int’l Film Serv. Co. v. Affiliated Distribs., Inc. 283 F. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1922). Thus, while it was incorrect to, as the defendant did, hold out the movie as a licensed adaptation
of Poetic Justice, it was nevertheless an unlicensed, and modified, version of The Valley of Silent
Men.
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author’s] standing, reputation, and prestige, and is in derogation of his
civil rights.” 53
Likewise, courts were willing to protect integrity rights to a degree.54
In Drummond v. Altemus, 55 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania restrained
(via temporary injunction) Altemus from selling a book containing
uncopyrighted lectures delivered by Henry Drummond (the Lowell
Lectures delivered in Boston in 1893). 56 The lectures in the book included
“additions and omissions which essentially alter the productions of the
author.” 57 Circuit Judge Dallas wrote:
The complainant does not base his claim to relief upon the statute, but
upon his right, quite distinct from any conferred by copyright, to
protection against having any literary matter published as his work
which is not actually his creation, and, incidentally, to prevent fraud
upon purchasers. That such right exists is too well settled, upon reason
and authority, to require demonstration . . . . 58

53. Curwood, 283 F. at 222. Judge Knox also elaborated upon movie producer’s duty
concerning editorial modifications: “I take it that, while scenery, action, and characters may be added
to an original story, and even supplant subordinate portions thereof, there is an obligation upon the
elaborator to retain and give appropriate expression to the theme, thought, and main action of that
which was originally written.” Id.
54. Bowker’s treatise on copyright also wrote that courts would protect integrity interests.
Bowker wrote that while some alterations such as “proof-reading correction or editorial revision”
were permissible, it would be “contrary to equity when they pervert, obscure, or otherwise
misrepresent the author.” BOWKER, supra note 34.
55. 60 F. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1894).
56. The noted evangelist, biologist, and lecturer, Henry Drummond delivered the Lowell
Lectures. When the lectures were copied and circulated, Drummond rushed to produce his own
version. See HENRY DRUMMOND, THE ASCENT OF MAN (1894).
57. Drummond, 60 F. at 338; see also BOWKER, supra note 34, at 264. Henry Drummond was
a frequent contributor to a periodical called the British Weekly. After delivering the Lowell Lectures,
he sent reports of the lectures to the British Weekly; however, he did not send them full reports or
transcripts. Henry Altemus, a Pennsylvania publisher, read the British Weekly reports and from them
recreated the lectures as part of a book. However, it appears he departed even from the partial account
in the British Reports. Judge Dallas found that “if [the British Weekly reports] had been literally
copied, and so as not to misrepresent its character and extent, the plaintiff would be without remedy;
but the fatal weakness in the defendant’s position is that, under [the] color of editing the author’s
work, he has represented a part of it as the whole, and even, as to the portion published, has materially
departed from the reports which he sets up in justification.” Drummond, 60 F. at 339.
58. Drummond, 60 F. at 338-39. While the contention of this Article is that there was a groping
towards a unique tort of moral rights from American courts during the mid-twentieth century, the
Royle case illustrates that equity also played an important role. Some cases, such as Curwood, 283 F.
219, were brought as suits in equity, rather than suits in law, presumably because the plaintiff wished
to obtain an equitable remedy, i.e., an injunction; see also Stevens v. Nat’l Broad. Co., No. 871182,
1966 WL 6436 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty., C.A. Feb. 11, 1966). But equity may also have played a more
substantive, and not merely remedial, role. In Royle, the judge’s appeal to equitable jurisdiction could
be evidence that the court viewed the attribution injury, not as a legal wrong, but as a distinct equitable
wrong (a hypothesis which has an intuitive appeal, given the understanding of equity as correcting
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The same holding was reached in Royle v. Dillingham, in which the
defendants modified the plaintiff’s play under a contract which provided
that the defendants would make no changes. 59 Judge Leventritt held that:
Probably under the common law, and certainly under his contract, the
plaintiff is within his rights in invoking equitable jurisdiction. Whether
we have gone quite as far as other countries whose literary history is
longer in the protection of literary property may be open to doubt; but
there is, as there should be, a growing tendency to bestow on authors
that full measure of protection which their unique property requires.
Whether the work is great or trivial, original or adapted, the principle
should be the same, so long as the work is the author’s own. 60

What really makes these cases interesting is that when the judges
upheld authorial moral rights claims, they did not base—explicitly,
anyway—those decisions upon preexisting common law causes of action.
For example, rather than find that the authors could make out successful
privacy, libel, or unfair competition cases, the judges could potentially be
understood as upholding moral rights qua moral rights. The judgments
could be interpreted as evidence that the law had some more specific (lex
specialis) means of redress for authors’ personal interests.
Of course, judges did in many other cases use preexisting causes of
actions to uphold authorial attribution and integrity interests. For example,
in Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing, an article about the customs of Palestine
under Mosaic Law was falsely attributed to Florence Ben-Oliel, a lecturer
in New York. 61 The Court of Appeals of New York found that the damage
to professional reputation that such an article could cause could
potentially be grounds for a libel action. Similarly, in Ellis v. Hurst, the
court found a breach of New York’s statutory right of publicity when the
defendant book publishers republished a book under the author’s true
name (Edward Ellis), which the author had originally published under a

gaps or inadequacies in the law). The author suspects that this idea of moral rights invasion as an
equitable wrong gradually became less prominent during the twentieth century as law and equity
became ever more fused. See John C.P. Goldberg & Henry E. Smith, Wrongful Fusion: Equity and
Tort, in EQUITY AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION (Goldberg et al. eds.) (forthcoming) (describing the
relation between equitable and legal wrongs, and the fusion of the two).
59. 104 N.Y.S. 783 (App. Div. 1907). Note that Drummond was not the only author suing
Altemus for apparently producing garbled versions of lectures. See Pott v. Altemus, 60 F. 339 (E.D.
Pa. 1894).
60. Royle, 104 N.Y.S. at 784.
61. 251 N.Y. 250 (1929).
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pseudonym (Lieutenant R. H. Jayne). 62 Other cases upholding authorial
moral rights under general common law causes of action exist. 63
B.

1940-1980

Cases upholding attribution and integrity interests continued to
appear from the 1940s to 1980s. But in distinction to the pre-1940s cases,
the terms “moral rights” and “droit moral” started to appear in court
judgments. By the mid-twentieth century, the concept of “moral rights”
was increasingly seeping into the U.S. legal consciousness; this was likely
for two reasons.
First, in 1928, article 6bis was added to the Berne Convention in the
Rome Revision Conference. 64 This provision required member states to
protect the attribution and integrity interests of foreign authors. 65 During
the 1930 to 1940 period, a number of legislative proposals were set forth
to enable the United States to join the Berne Convention. 66 However, the
idea of joining a union that would require the adoption of moral rights was
resisted by some copyright industries, in particular, the motion picture
industry. 67 Hollywood was troubled by the idea that scriptwriters could
enjoy personal inalienable rights existing post-sale, because such rights
could potentially interfere with movie studios’ ability to edit and distribute
films. 68 Nevertheless, while attempts to join the Berne Convention failed,
62. 128 N.Y.S. 144 (App. Div. 1910).
63. See generally Harte v. De Witt, reported in Rights in Literary Property, 1 CENTRAL L.J.
360 (1874); D’Altomonte v. N.Y. Herald, 154 A.D. 453 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913); Gershwin v. Ethical
Publ’g Co., Inc., 166 Misc. 39 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937).
64. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, as amended,
Rome, June 2, 1928.
65. Id.
66. S. 2465, 74th Cong. (1935) (introduced by Mr. Ryan Duffy, Senator for Wisconsin); S.
3043, 76th Cong. (1940) (introduced by Mr. Elbert D. Thomas, Senator for Utah). See generally A.A.
Goldman, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revisions from 1901 to 1954, in Copyright Society
of the USA, Studies on Copyright, vol. 2, 1101 (New Jersey, 1953).
67. See generally Statements of Barbara Ringer, Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1987, Hearings on HR 1623 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Congress (1987) at
694 (“I was certainly given to know all the local color that surrounded all those efforts to get us into
Berne back in the Thirties, up through the bill that was introduced in 1940. The big opponent then
was the motion picture industry, which had the same kind of reaction you are describing—that they
were users rather than copyright owners and that they couldn’t possibly have moral rights; it would
ruin the industry and so forth.”); see also Goldman, supra note 66, at 8-11 (noting the objection of
motion picture producers to moral rights and to Berne ratification).
68. This concern was caused, or exacerbated, by the Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Co.
litigation. In 1925, Theodore Dreiser wrote the twentieth century classic, An American Tragedy.
Dreiser subsequently licensed Paramount to produce a motion picture version of the novel. Paramount
intended to distribute the new motion picture in 1931. But, in July 1931, on the eve of the movie’s
distribution, Dreiser filed for an injunction in Westchester County, New York. Dreiser alleged that
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the open discussion of moral rights in Congress, coupled with the
international adoption of moral rights, must surely have affected how
courts viewed attribution and integrity cases.
Second, at this time, American lawyers began to publish the first
academic texts regarding the “moral rights” of authors. In 1938, Stephen
Ladas published The International Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property, 69 in which he wrote that, while the moral right of authors was
“fully recognized and developed in the civil-law countries,” such a right
had “not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States” and that
no such right was “referred to by legislation, court decisions or writers.” 70
By contrast, Martin Roeder’s 1940 Harvard Law Review article, The
Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 71 came to a different conclusion. Roeder found that the
“doctrine of moral right is recognized by the common law to a limited
extent,” although the theoretical basis of the right “ha[d] not been
delineated.” 72 Looking over the cases, Roeder found that doctrines of
libel, unfair competition, privacy, and copyright had been used to protect
attribution and integrity interests, alongside an incipient sui generis tort of
moral rights invasion. 73 However, the fact that the moral right had been
Paramount had “botched” the portrayal of the novel. The motion picture failed to accurately convey
the theme of social criticism found in the original novel, and instead focused too heavily on the court
room drama. While the original contract between Dreiser and Paramount had clearly given Paramount
the right to adapt the novel, Dreiser argued that there was an understanding that the movie would still
be a faithful representation of the novel. Dreiser’s argument was unsuccessful, and the court declined
to award an injunction (while providing no reasons for the order). Order Denying Plaintiff’s
Injunction, Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Corp., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931). Such an episode arguably played
into the hands of motion picture producers, and other “users” of expressive content, and enabled them
to argue that giving authors more powerful rights could interfere dramatically with their own
businesses.
69. STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY (1938).
70. Id. at 802. Ladas did go on to write that “[h]owever, the interests of the author grouped
elsewhere under the term ‘moral right’ are protected in the United States by the common law and
State legislation concerning the right of personality in general.” Id. With the benefit of hindsight the
fact that the label “moral rights” was not referred to in the United States before 1938 is unsurprising;
the term had not yet penetrated the American legal vocabulary.
71. Roeder, supra note 6. See also Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American
Copyright Law–A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (1950). But see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections
on the Law of Copyright II., 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1945) (“For the time being, we had better
concentrate our energies on the pecuniary aspects of copyright. We have enough trouble there. After
we get the issues of dollars and cents settled satisfactorily, we can go on to moral rights.”).
72. Roeder, supra note 6, at 578. It seems likely that Martin Roeder had some exposure to the
French legal system. See Paid Notice: Deaths Roeder, Martin A., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/05/classified/paid-notice-deaths-roeder-martin-a.html
[https://perma.cc/ZMN2-NT5F] (writing that Roeder “had a degree from the Sorbonne in Paris”).
73. See generally Roeder, supra note 6.
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developed in a piecemeal fashion was not fully satisfactory, as it lead to
“confusion as to the basic elements of the doctrine.”74 The way forward,
Roeder argued, was to continue to develop the unique tort theory of moral
rights protection; 75 over the coming years, courts did precisely that.
One of the most famous cases from this era is Shostakovich v.
Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. 76 The Russian composer Dmitry
Shostakovich sued in New York to restrain Fox from distributing the film,
The Iron Curtain. 77 The Iron Curtain dramatized U.S.S.R. espionage
activities in Canada. 78 The movie used public domain music written by
Shostakovich and credited Shostakovich as the composer in the opening
credits. 79 Shostakovich sued under New York libel law. 80 The film
portrayed one U.S.S.R. spy disowning the U.S.S.R. espionage activities. 81
Shostakovich claimed that the connection of his music to depictions of
disloyalty made it appear as if he approved or endorsed such a film, and
as if he were being disloyal to his country. 82 The court ultimately rejected
Shostakovich’s libel action, finding that the mere fact that his music was
played in the film did not necessarily imply that he approved or endorsed
the movie’s message. 83 But more interestingly for the purposes of this
Article is the court’s discussion of moral rights. Citing Roeder’s article,
Judge Koch wrote that “[c]onceivably, under the doctrine of Moral Right
the court could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or work,
in the public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the
author’s rights.” 84 Koch acknowledged, however, that “the doctrine
presents much difficulty.” 85 In particular, he found there may be a conflict
between the author’s moral right and the rights of others to freely use
public domain material. 86 As a result, Koch concluded that “in the absence
of any clear showing of the infliction of a willful injury or of any invasion
of a moral right, this court should not consider granting the drastic relief

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See also Moral Right of Artists, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 132
(1949) (discussing Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox).
77. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S. 2d at 576.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id. at 578.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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asked [for] on either theory.” 87 While not rejecting moral rights, and
leaving the door open for their use in the future, the court decided not to
rely on the concept in this case.
Shostakovich was quickly followed by Granz v. Harris. 88 Norman
Granz was a famous Jazz impresario (producer and promoter) who created
a series of well-known jazz concerts going by the name Jazz at the
Philharmonic. 89 One of these concerts, which took place in Los Angeles,
was recorded by Granz onto a sixteen-inch disk. 90 Granz sold the master
disks to Herbert Harris (a phonograph manufacturer in New York), who
in return would manufacture records for public sale. 91 Herbert Harris
proceeded to re-record the musical composition onto smaller, ten-inch,
disks. 92 Granz later sued Harris. The re-recording of the sounds had
caused some of the records’ music to be deleted. 93 Granz claimed the
elimination of the music “substantially detracted from the artistic quality
of the musical performance with corresponding detriment to [his]
reputation.” 94 Granz failed on this claim at trial. After listening to the two
records, Judge McGhoey concluded that the only material deleted in the
new recordings was the reaction of the audience and only a trivial amount
of music, and thus the artistic quality of the music was intact. 95 However,
this factual finding was overturned on appeal as clearly erroneous by the
Second Circuit. 96 The appellate judges found that a “[full] eight minutes
of music” was omitted. 97 The Second Circuit then held for Granz on the
basis of breach of contract. 98 The contract between the parties required
that the manufactured records bore the text: “Presented by Norman
Granz.” 99 The contractual requirement that Harris credit Granz carried by
87. Id. at 579. Shostakovich had greater success in France. Shostakovich and his co-plaintiffs
successfully asserted their moral rights claim in French court and thus prevented the distribution of
the film there. See PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE
INTERNET 117 (2013).
88. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952). Norman Granz was a citizen of California and Herbert Harris
was a citizen of New York, thus the case was filed in the Southern District of New York under
diversity jurisdiction, while applying New York state law. See also Preminger v. Columbia Picture
Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363 (N.Y. Special & Trial Term 1966).
89. Granz, 198 F.2d at 586.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Granz v. Harris, 93 F.Supp. 906, 909 (S.D.N.Y 1951).
95. Id. at 910.
96. See Granz, 198 F.2d 585.
97. Id. at 587.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 588.
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implication a duty “not to sell records which make the required legend a
false representation.” 100 It was, according to the court, a false
representation to hold out Granz as the producer of the modified music. 101
The opinion also noted that, in absence of a contractual term, it would
nevertheless be unfair competition to manufacture and sell this version
under the plaintiff’s name. 102
But the case is most known for the concurring opinion written by
Judge Jerome Frank. Frank’s opinion revealed an internal struggle over
the status of moral rights. At the outset, Frank appeared to endorse moral
rights protection and found that it was, to an extent, already present in
U.S. law:
I agree, of course, that, whether by way of contract or tort, plaintiff
(absent his consent to the contrary) is entitled to prevention of the
publication, as his, of a garbled version of his uncopyrighted product.
This is not novel doctrine: Byron obtained an injunction from an English
court restraining the publication of a book purporting to contain his
poems only, but which included some not of his authorship. American
courts, too, have enforced such a right. Those courts have also enjoined
the use by another of the characteristics of an author of repute in such
manner as to deceive buyers into erroneously believing that they were
buying a work of that author. Those courts, moreover, have granted
injunctive relief in these circumstances: An artist sells one of his works
to the defendant who substantially changes it and then represents the
altered material to the public as that artist’s product. Whether the work
is copyrighted or not, the established rule is that, even if the contract
with the artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications (e.g.,
where a novel or stage play is sold for adaptation as a movie), it is an
actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version which
substantially departs from the original. Under the authorities, the
defendant’s conduct here, as my colleagues say, may also be considered
a kind of ‘unfair competition’ or ‘passing off.’ 103

Yet, towards the middle of the opinion, Judge Frank highlighted that the
term “moral rights” would be novel in U.S. law:
Plaintiff, in asking for such relief, relied in part not on the contract but
on the doctrine of artists’ ‘moral right,’ a compendious label of a ‘bundle

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. However, the court did think the defendant could lawfully sell abbreviated versions of
the music, “provided [the defendant] did not describe it as a recording of music presented by the
plaintiff.” Id.
103. Id. at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).
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of rights’ enforced in many ‘civil law’ countries. Able legal
thinkers, pointing out that American courts have already recognized a
considerable number of the rights in that ‘bundle,’ have urged that our
courts use the ‘moral right’ symbol. Those thinkers note that the label
‘right of privacy’ served to bring to the attention of our courts a common
center of perspectives previously separated in the decisions, and that the
use of that label induced further novel and valuable judicial
perspectives. 104

Frank also noted a number of objections that could be raised to using the
term “moral rights”:
To this suggestion there are these objections: (a) ‘Moral right’ seems to
indicate to some persons something not legal, something meta-legal. (b)
The ‘moral right’ doctrine, as applied in some countries, includes very
extensive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions are not yet
prepared to acknowledge; as a result, the phrase ‘moral right’ seems to
have frightened some of those courts to such an extent that they have
unduly narrowed artists’ rights. (c) Finally, it is not always an
unmitigated boon to devise and employ such a common name. As we
have said elsewhere: ‘A new name, a novel label expressive of a new
generalization, can have immense consequences.’ 105

After considering these objections, Frank came to a restrained conclusion:
“Without rejecting the doctrine of ‘moral right,’ I think that, in the light
of the foregoing, we should not rest decision on that doctrine where, as
here, it is not necessary to do so.” 106 Much like Koch in Shostakovich,
Frank seemed generally to support the idea of moral rights protection, but
yet, noting some objections, was disinclined to base his decision upon the
doctrine in a case such as this, where the same result could be reached
under less controversial doctrines. 107
104. Id. at 590.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 591. Melville Nimmer in the 1976 edition of Nimmer on Copyright wrote that federal
and state courts had held that “moral rights are not recognized in the United States.” MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 443 (1976). For this proposition, Nimmer cited Frank’s
concurrence in Granz, stating that Frank’s opinion included a “discussion of the rejection by
American courts of the term ‘moral rights.’” Id. at 443 n. 390. This was erroneous as, if anything,
Frank had come to the opposite conclusion, finding that moral rights were explicitly not rejected.
107. Judge Frank’s determination to write about the state of moral rights in U.S. law is
intriguing. Like the majority, Judge Frank could have decided the case on contractual grounds, and
bypassed the moral rights issue altogether. This would have been a particularly easy step to take
because the moral rights claim was not heavily relied upon by Granz’s attorneys. Granz’s attorneys’
brief primarily argued that the parties’ agreement did not permit modifications, and thus Harris’s
modification infringed the underlying copyright property right, Brief for Appellant at 7-15, Granz v.
Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (No. 03-3674). Granz’s attorneys raised the moral rights issue
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The moral rights tort took another incremental step forward in Seroff
v. Simon & Schuster. 108 Victor Seroff, the author of a biography of
Rachmaninoff, sued his publisher, Simon & Schuster, for allowing a poor
French translation of the work to be published. 109 The court found that
while most of the errors contained in the French translation were trivial,
at some point the translator had “consciously sought to sensationalize and
inject pungent language in order to make the book more attractive to a
certain segment of the French public.” 110 Justice Geller wrote (somewhat
obliquely) that the court “appreciates that the failure of the community,
years ago, to protect their gifted men of letters led to tragedies which
comprise scars in the history of civilization.” 111 Geller went on to note
that while the precise cause of action had not been clearly defined by the
plaintiff’s counsel, it would appear “to be analogous to what has been
called the ‘moral right’ of an author or artist to object to any deformation,
mutilation or other alteration of his work.” 112 Geller found that the term
“moral right” is “not mentioned in our Copyright Act” but nevertheless:
[A] right analogous to ‘moral right’, though not referred to as such, has
been recognized in this country and the common law countries of the
British Commonwealth so that in at least a number of situations the
integrity and reputation of an artistic creator have been protected by
judicial pronouncements. 113

Geller relied on Roeder’s article to bolster the claim that common
law doctrines, and a sui generis doctrine of moral rights protection, had at
times been used to protect authorial moral rights.114 Nevertheless, relying
on Seabury’s decision in Clemens v. Press Publishing, Geller found that,
while authors have rights to “defend themselves against the free or
slipshod use of their creations,” such rights may be transferred or
only as a secondary argument. Should it be found that Granz reserved no rights in the work, then, the
attorneys claimed, there was some authority that the creator could nevertheless prevent alteration or
deformation of the work. Id. at 15 (citing Clemens v. Press Publ’g, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910) and Roeder,
supra note 6). The fact that Judge Frank could easily have sidestepped the moral rights issue altogether
makes one question why he felt it necessary to discuss U.S. moral rights protection at such length.
108. 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Special and Trial Term, 1957).
109. Id. at 771.
110. Id. at 773.
111. Id. at 774. Judge Geller’s son, Bruce, would later to go on to have a successful career in
the arts, as a television writer and producer (originating programs such as Mission Impossible and
Mannix). See Bruce Geller and Stephen Gentry, TV Executives, Die in Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES (May
23,
1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/05/23/archives/bruce-geller-and-stephen-gentry-tvexecutives-die-in-plane-crash.html [http://perma.cc/62NJ-C2CM].
112. Seroff, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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surrendered by contract. 115 Ultimately, the contract was interpreted as
barring Seroff’s claim. The contract permitted the publishers to translate
the work for foreign publication. 116 Furthermore, the customary practice
at such time, with which Seroff was aware, was that such translations and
foreign distribution would frequently not be handled by the publisher, but
would be contracted out to a third party. 117 It was held, therefore, that
Seroff could not bring a claim against the publisher for the
mistranslations, but instead “knew, or should have known, that Simon &
Schuster would handle the book exactly as it did” and there was “no merit
to plaintiff’s contention that Simon & Schuster were remiss in their duty
to him.” 118 With hindsight, one wonders how the case would have been
resolved had Seroff sued the translator, rather than his publisher.
Of course, New York was not the only state flirting with a tort of
moral rights protection during this time. An interesting preliminary
injunction was awarded in 1966 in the California case of Stevens v.
National Broadcasting Corp. 119 In that case, the defendant was enjoined
from:
[C]utting or editing the motion picture “A Place in the Sun” for the
purpose of inserting therein in connection with the broadcast of said
motion picture over television any commercials, [advertisements] or
other messages, skits, speeches, playlets, musical or other material
which will so alter, adversely affect or emasculate the artistic or pictorial
quality of said motion picture so as to destroy or distort materially or
substantially the mood, effect, or continuity of said motion picture as
produced and directed by plaintiff. 120

Relying on Frank’s concurring opinion in Granz, Judge Nutter stated that
“a court of equity has a duty when presented with a novel situation to
fashion remedies to protect parties and litigants against new harms where
it appears that there is an inadequate remedy at law,” and, “I think the
court has the right to protect the artistic integrity of a product.”121
Arguably the high-water mark of moral rights came in the 1970s. A
number of cases in this decade stand out, including Chesler v. Avon Book
Division, Hearst Publication. 122 In 1972, Dr. Phyllis Chesler, a lecturer

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 775.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 777.
No. 871182, 1966 WL 6436 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty., C.A. Feb. 11, 1966).
Id.
Id.
352 NY.S.2d 552 (Special Term 1973).
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and prominent feminist psychologist, authored a book entitled Women and
Madness, which was published by Doubleday in hardback. 123
Subsequently, Doubleday contracted with Avon Book to publish a
paperback version (as the contract with Chesler permitted).124 In this
action, Chesler sued Avon Book, alleging that the paperback contained
many changes (omitted or altered text, illustrations, footnotes, etc.) that
amounted to a mutilation of her work. 125 Justice Arnold Fein of the New
York Supreme Court found that the contract Chesler signed did not
require that she consent to the format of the paperback version, but
nevertheless, she was “not powerless to prevent slipshod or truncated
use[s] of her work.” 126 Although the authorities were sparse, he agreed
that “it is clear that even after a transfer or assignment of an author’s work,
the author has a property right that it shall not be used for a purpose not
intended or in a manner which does not fairly represent the creation of the
author.” 127 Nevertheless, Fein, much like Frank and Koch previously, was
unsure of the precise status of moral rights in New York law:
Plaintiff relies in part on the doctrine of an author’s ‘moral right’ which
she asks the court to enforce so as to protect the integrity of her work.
The authorities she cites do not establish that such right is recognized in
New York. The careful and extensive discussion of the authorities in
Seroff . . . indicates the problems and the limited recognition accorded
to the concept. 128

However, despite the unclear status of the doctrine, Fein agreed that:
[T]he plaintiff’s right to relief need not be bottomed upon the application
of a theory of law which has not been afforded full recognition in this
state. The court should not withhold appropriate relief by applying a
rigid construction to causes of action or claims asserted by a plaintiff, if
a right entitled to protection is shown. 129

Ultimately, Fein agreed that the contract permitted Doubleday and its
assignees to make alterations. 130 Nonetheless, the judge agreed that Avon
Book must take appropriate action to inform the public that changes had
been made. There is “an obligation to make known to readers that the right

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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[of alteration] has been exercised.” 131 Fein concluded that “[t]his is simply
telling the truth.” 132
Similarly, in Edison v. Viva International, the New York Supreme
Court appeared to uphold the idea of moral rights protection, but
following Seroff, found that the author’s moral rights were superseded by
contract. 133 In this case, Robert Edison’s article, Why Do Men Hate
Barbara Walters, was substantially altered by the defendant publishers. 134
Edison complained that the article which was published was “materially
altered, mutilated, and changed” in such a way that “destroyed the existing
content of said article.” 135 Judge Murphy seemed somewhat sympathetic
to this argument, finding that the term moral right, “although recognized
in civil law countries, is not mentioned in our Copyright Act,” but that
nevertheless:
[A] right analogous to “moral right”, though not referred to as such, has
been recognized in this country and in the common law countries of the
British Commonwealth so that in at least a number of situations the
integrity and reputation of an artistic creator have been protected by
judicial pronouncements. 136

Sadly for Edison, in this case, the contract was interpreted as permitting
the defendant to make alterations without his consent. 137 Nevertheless, to
“publish in the name of a well-known author any literary work, the
authorship of which would tend to injure an author holding his position in
the world of letters, has been held to be libel.” 138 Thus, the court
concluded that if the plaintiff could specify particular passages in the
article that expressed opinions different from that of the original, then he
may have a good ground to plead libel. 139
The last case in the 1970s is also the most well-known: Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co. 140 The British comedy group, Monty Python,
licensed the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to show their
television show, The Flying Circus. 141 The BBC granted Time-Life Films
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1979).
134. Id. at 204.
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. at 206.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 207.
139. Id.
140. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Comment: Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co., 90 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1976).
141. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17.
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the right to distribute the shows in the United States, and subsequently
Time-Life licensed American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to show two
90-minute specials of the programs. 142 ABC proceeded to alter the shows
to make them suitable for broadcast. 143 The modifications included
omitting parts of the programs, inserting commercials, and removing parts
of the shows which were deemed offensive. 144 The Monty Python
comedians saw the ABC version and were “appalled” at the treatment of
their work, but were unsuccessful in their initial attempt to gain a
preliminary injunction restraining ABC from showing the work. 145
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit granted the preliminary
injunction, while writing supportively of the authors’ moral rights. Circuit
Judge Lumbard wrote that it:
[S]eems likely that appellants will succeed on the theory that, regardless
of the right ABC had to broadcast an edited program, the cuts made
constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty Python’s work. This cause
of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist’s work, finds
its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, which
may generally be summarized as including the right of the artist to have
his work attributed to him in the form in which he created it. 146

Lumbard acknowledged that American copyright law, “as presently
written, does not recognize moral rights,” but nevertheless found that
moral rights fit neatly with the economic incentive policy underlying the
Copyright Act. 147 That is, the “economic incentive for artistic and
intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copyright
law, cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for
mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the
artists are financially dependent.” 148 For this reason, courts have “long
granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist’s work by relying on
theories outside the statutory law of copyright, such as contract law.” 149
While such decisions are “clothed in terms of proprietary right in one’s
creation, they also properly vindicate the author’s personal right to

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form,”
Lumbard wrote while citing Roeder’s article. 150
Of course, the cases from this period do not all point in the same
direction. Two cases from the 1940s in particular stand out as rejecting
moral rights protection. First was the Seventh Circuit case of Vargas v.
Esquire. 151 In this case, Alberto Vargas produced artwork (adult paintings
of women) for Esquire magazine under contract, and gained notoriety as
a “pin-up” artist. 152 Esquire proceeded to publish a number of Vargas’s
paintings without his signature.153 Vargas sued to enjoin their
reproduction without his signature. However, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed the claim, primarily on the ground that the relevant contract
granted Esquire “the right to use, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of the
[paintings] as it shall see fit.” 154 This contractual language led the court to
conclude that this was a case in which the plaintiff “by plain and
unambiguous language completely divested himself of every vestige of
title and ownership of the pictures, as well as the right to their possession,
control and use.” 155 Thus, the contract barred Vargas’s claim. But the
court went further and also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that his moral
rights had been breached. Relying on Ladas’s statement that moral rights
protection had “not yet received acceptance in the law of the United
States,” the court found that the plaintiff’s plea amounted to a prayer for
a “change in the law in this country to conform to that of certain other
countries,” 156 on which point the court wrote that it “need not stop to
inquire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative
or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to
make any new law in this respect.” 157 How are we to interpret the court’s
disinclination to make any new law in this respect? While hardly a ringing
endorsement of moral rights, the court still seemed to leave some room
for potential future judicial development of the right.
The most striking rejection of moral rights came in Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church in City of New York. 158 Alfred D. Crimi was
employed in 1938 to paint a fresco for a local New York church. 159 Some
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
164 F.2d 522 (7th. Cir. 1947).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id. at 526.
Id.
89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1949).
Id. at 814.
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of the parishioners objected to the mural, on the grounds that it depicted
Christ with a bare chest and placed more emphasis on his physical
attributes than his spiritual ones. 160 In 1946, the church painted over the
mural without notifying the plaintiff. 161 The plaintiff sued hoping to
compel the defendant to remove the obliterating paints, or alternatively to
allow the plaintiff to remove the fresco from the church at the defendant’s
expense, or finally, for $50,000 in damages. 162 Official Referee
Lockwood, citing Ladas and Roeder, acknowledged that continental
European countries provided authors with peculiar and distinctive rights
in their works. 163 However, citing Ladas and Vargas v. Esquire,
Lockwood concluded that the plaintiff did not retain rights after the work
had been unconditionally sold. 164 The time for the artist to reserve rights
was when the contract was drafted.
Nevertheless, even this case comes with a question mark next to it.
Lockwood characterized the case as involving the destruction, rather than
modification, of the artwork. Lockwood cited a passage from Ladas that
posed the following question: “The [purchaser] is not permitted to violate
[the artwork’s] integrity but is he permitted to destroy the work of art?” 165
Lockwood proceeded to cite a French case holding that a church could
destroy wall paintings without the consent of the original artist, and cited
foreign authors on the issue of destruction of artworks. 166 This
conceptualization was significant because, while many countries
permitted authors to prevent the modification of artwork, far fewer
entitled the author to object to complete destruction. Ladas, after noting
that the purchaser of a work was not permitted to violate its integrity,
decided that it was questionable whether this right extended to prevent
destruction (in cases of works of art). 167 Indeed, article 6bis of the Berne
Convention did not (and still does not) require Union members to grant
authors rights against destruction, but it did require that states entitle the

160. Id. at 815.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 816.
164. Id. at 819.
165. Id. at 817.
166. Id. at 816. The relevant case was Lacasse et Welcome c. Abbé Quénard (Cour de Paris,
April 27, 1934, D.H.1934 p. 385), a summary of which can be found in AMELIA V. VELTRAONE, THE
LEGAL AND MORAL RIGHTS OF ALL ARTISTS 41-42 (2003). Lockwood also cites French jurists
writing on the subject of destruction. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
167. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 817; Ladas, supra note 69, at 603. Although Ladas does appear to
agree that destruction should be prevented as it may harm the public interest in preserving culturally
important artworks.
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author to object to prejudicial modifications. 168 One speculates whether
Lockwood would have come to the same conclusion had he characterized
the case as a modification issue.
Lastly, it is also important to keep in mind that courts also protected
attribution and integrity interests through existing common law causes of
action, such as Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis. 169 Once again, what
distinguishes the cases above is that in these cases, the courts seemed to
consider a tort of moral rights invasion as something distinct from causes
of action such as libel, privacy, or unfair competition.
C.

Post-1980

When reading the cases in the 1940 to 1980 period, one gets a sense
that courts were close to developing a unique tort of moral rights invasion.
While some cases like Vargas and Crimi went against the grain, many
courts exhibited a growing willingness to enforce a right analogous to
moral rights. Intriguingly, this new cause of action was not a mere carbon
copy of European moral rights, but instead was a distinctly American
creation. In several respects, the budding moral rights tort was distinct
from the romanticized version of moral rights portrayed by some
comparative scholars. First, the normative justification for moral rights
protection differed, arguably, from that found in continental Europe. With
some exceptions, judges protected attribution and integrity interests, not
out of respect for the inherent dignity of authorship, but because
permitting false attribution or prejudicial modifications of works could
harm authors’ reputations; thus, there was a more defamation-like
rationale to the moral rights tort. 170 And second, most judges concluded
168. Hungarian attempts to extend the original article 6bis right of integrity to prevent
destructions were unsuccessful, although the Berne Union members in Rome did recommend that
destruction of artworks should be prevented. See ADENEY, supra note 1, at 137 (citing Documents de
la conference de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948, 427 (Berne 1951)).
169. 8 N.Y. 2d 187 (1960).
170. In some cases, the normative rationale took on a clearly economic flavor. As Gilliam
demonstrates, some judges were concerned that authors’ incentives to create would be dampened if
the author could not police the attribution and integrity of the work. This rationale is similar to what
Jeanne Fromer calls “expressive incentives,” i.e., that the “incentive to create ought to be all that much
stronger when intellectual property laws are structured to protect and to communicate solicitude for
authors’ personhood and labor interests.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012). This rationale should be distinguished from an
alternative economic rationale focusing on third-party externalities, see Henry Hansmann & Marina
Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 95 (1997). It is an interesting question whether this incentive rationale is consistent
with modern copyright policy. In a number of fair use cases, courts have explained that copyright law
should not be used to eradicate all activities which have the potential to dampen authors’ creative
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that moral rights could be waived via contract. Not many on the bench
were willing to uphold inalienable moral rights like those found in some
European countries. These idiosyncratic features of American moral
rights protection came about as judges tried to reconcile conflicting moral
and legal principles. On one hand, judges frequently had an intuition that
authors deserved some attribution and integrity protection, but on the
other hand, such protection necessarily had to co-exist with the rest of the
U.S. legal system, which viewed copyrightable works as transferable
commodities, and which was heavily consequentialist in tone. The judicial
attempt to fit moral rights protection into the existing U.S. legal
framework resulted in a toned-down, but uniquely American, conception
of moral rights.
But something strange happened post 1980: the cases articulating a
sui generis moral rights tort started to dry up. The cases referring to moral
rights petered out in a noticeable way. Of course, such cases did not
disappear altogether, as demonstrated by the 1988 case of Society of
Survivors of Riga Ghetto v. Huttenbach. 171 In that case, holocaust
survivors (of the Riga Ghetto) employed Professor Henry Huttenbach to
document their wartime experiences. 172 The contract between the Society
and Huttenbach assigned full copyright ownership to the Society, but also
stated that the manuscript would be published “under the authorship of
professor Henry R. Huttenbach, with the Society mentioned as sponsor or
publisher.” 173 However, before the work was complete, the relationship
between Huttenbach and the Society broke down. Members of the Society
were unsatisfied with perceived inaccuracies in Huttenbach’s work and
wished to terminate the contract with Huttenbach and to complete the
work with another author. 174 The Society then sued Huttenbach for breach
of contract. After holding that the Society had failed to prove a breach of
contract, Judge Freedman proceeded to ask “whether the publisher as
incentives. For example, allowing users to write scathing reviews may potentially have negative
reputation-based consequences for some authors, and in turn may negatively affect their creative
incentives; yet, such “harmful” consequences do not mean scathing reviews are copyright
infringements. Instead, copyright, courts have explained, should only be used to deter activities which
have a specific type of incentive effect, i.e., financial detriment flowing from economic substitution
of goods in the marketplace. As a result, one wonders whether the type of reputation harm discussed
in Gilliam, and possible consequential dampening of creative incentives, would be viewed by courts
today as something with which copyright should be concerned. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that cognizable market harm is market substitution, not harm from
criticism). Thanks to Rebecca Tushnet for pointing out this issue.
171. 535 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1988).
172. Id. at 671.
173. Id. at 672.
174. Id. at 673.
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owner of the copyright has the right to drastically change or revise the
author’s manuscript and then publish it either under another authorship or
combined authorship.” 175 Freedman answered negatively, not only
because to do so would breach the credit clause in the parties’ contract,
but also because such lack of credit would amount to an infringement of
the author’s moral rights. 176 Freedman cited Edison, Granz, and Gilliam,
repeating the familiar language that “a right analogous to ‘moral right’ . . .
has been recognized in this country and in the common-law countries of
the British Commonwealth,” and concluded that use of the manuscript
prepared by Huttenbach “would constitute passing off in violation of the
author’s moral rights.” 177
Huttenbach was the last case wherein one finds substantial judicial
development of the moral rights concept. Nevertheless, the New York
legal encyclopedia, New York Jurisprudence, continues to cite
Huttenbach, Edison, and Shostakovich for the proposition that “a right
analogous to a moral right has been recognized in this country so that in
at least a number of situations, the integrity and reputation of an artistic
creator have been protected by judicial pronouncements.” 178 And there is
the occasional dictum supporting moral rights. For example, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid held that the
author, Reid, may have rights against a copyright owner who would
publish an “excessively mutilated or altered version” of artwork, and cited
Gilliam and literature on moral rights. 179
However, for the most part, explicit judicial discussion of authorial
moral rights fell away after 1980. This is somewhat surprising given that
academic commentary during this period was still generally supportive of
moral rights protection. In 1976, the famous comparative law scholar,
John Merryman, published an essay, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet,
that argued for greater moral rights protection. 180 Merryman concluded
that there was a substantial distance between “the protection of the
integrity of the work of art in other parts of the world and the feeble
functional equivalents in our law.” 181 Also interesting is the 1988 article,
The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 675.
18 N.Y. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 29 (2011).
846 F.2d. 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
John Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976).
Id. at 1049.
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Moral Rights of Authors, by Edward Damich. 182 Damich argued that
American common law contained a general background right of
personality, which was the basis for other personal rights, such as the right
of privacy. 183 And while not necessarily arguing for enhanced protection,
Damich proposed that the general right of personality could provide a
principled foundation for the development of moral rights, 184 should
courts wish to develop such law. The question is, why did courts not
continue to go down that path?
III. REASONS FOR STAGNATION
There are obvious and interesting parallels between the evolution of
moral rights in the United States and the evolution of the right of privacy.
Both authorial moral rights and the right of privacy are considered to be
“personal rights.” Both were principally judge-made common law
developed rights. Indeed, Martin Roeder’s 1940 article shared a similar
argumentative style with the famous article by Justices Warren and
Brandeis, Right to Privacy: both articles cataloged the instances of
protection under the disparate headings of the common law, from which
a more specific legal right was induced. 185 But, whereas the right of
privacy was ultimately adopted, in one form or another, by the majority
of states, the moral rights tort failed to fully flourish. 186 Why was this the
fate of moral rights?
One potential answer is that judges in the late twentieth century
simply rejected the idea of moral rights. Perhaps the judiciary in the midtwentieth century flirted with the idea of moral rights protection, but
ultimately came to their senses in the late twentieth century and refused
to push this un-American doctrine any further. This theory is
182. Edward Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the
Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988).
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id.
185. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D, Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
186. Another interesting comparison is between moral rights and the right of publicity. The
judicially created right of publicity not only flourished in the mid-twentieth century, but also was
greatly influenced by some of the same individuals who were influential in the development of moral
rights, see e.g. Haelan Laboriatories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953)
(per Judge Jerome Frank); Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS
203 (1954). If one were cynical, one might argue that the right of publicity, a transferable property
right, flourished because this benefited Hollywood’s interests (who could then acquire and
monopolize commercial exploitation of celebrities’ personas), whereas moral rights were antithetical
to Hollywood’s interests because they placed greater power in the hands of creators. On the history
of the right of publicity, see JENNIFER ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED
FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 45-64 (2018).
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unpersuasive. There are no cases from this period which clearly reject the
idea of moral rights protection. In the 1940s, cases such as Vargas and
Crimi, at the very least, cast aspersions upon moral rights protections, but
there is no equivalent stand-out case from the late twentieth century.
Furthermore, at this time, academic commentary surrounding moral rights
remained largely positive. There is, in other words, little evidence to
believe that there was a reasoned rejection of moral rights.
However, a certain amount of judicial inertia surely played a role.
While there is little reason to believe courts rejected moral rights, the issue
of moral rights always raised—and continues to raise—mixed emotions
amongst American lawyers. Koch’s opinion in Shostakovich is typical:
the judge appeared to have a moral intuition, or hunch, that authors
deserve some attribution and integrity protection, but found this intuition
hard to reconcile with countervailing intuitions about the property system
and the place of free speech in American society. Given how typical this
conflict was (and remains to be), it is not surprising that courts were
somewhat hamstrung by indecision and did not wholly adopt a moral
rights protection.
There was also no “trigger” case that would have spurred
development of moral rights. Most cases, such as Granz or Huttenbach,
did not require the court to use moral rights protection in order to uphold
the author’s claim. In such cases, courts could nearly always rely on a
more familiar, less contentious cause of action, such as unfair competition
or breach of contract, to reach the desired conclusion. On top of that, many
of the controversies (such as Seroff) presented hard cases where it was not
entirely clear which party should prevail. One wonders what would have
happened if a case had come before an appellate court in which an
aggrieved author had a strong and clear attribution or integrity interest,
and the only feasible way to protect that interest was through a unique
moral rights tort. Perhaps such a case would have acted as a “trigger” for
moral rights development.
Arguably, the leading reason behind the stagnation was the impact
of the Copyright Act of 1976. Congress chose not to adopt any significant
moral rights protection during the copyright revision process. 187 The
decision not to embed moral rights into the copyright statute potentially
affected courts’ desire to develop the concept further; Congress had the
187. Partly this may have been based on the view that U.S. law already provided sufficient
protection. A Copyright Office study prepared by William Strauss as part of the legislative revision
process compared U.S. law to the laws of continental European states. Strauss concluded that “the
courts in the United States arrive at much the same results as do European courts.” See William
Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, STUDY NO. 4, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, at 141 (1959).
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opportunity to create an American moral rights law, should they have seen
fit, but chose not to do so. The time for moral rights development was,
perhaps, over. In addition, the Copyright Act contained a new provision
preempting state laws’ equivalent to the rights contained in the Copyright
Act, 188 after which courts were perhaps unwilling to develop a state law
moral rights cause of action, which could potentially be subject to a
preemption claim. At least one commentator believed that courts were
likely to find such an equivalency, and concluded that the adoption of the
preemption clause “figures to wipe out the moral rights doctrine.” 189
In addition to the preemption clause, and the statute’s failure to adopt
a moral rights provision, the Copyright Act was also co-extensive with a
shift in copyright law-making authority. In an intellectual history of
copyright, Shyam Balganesh argues that the Copyright Act, and modern
copyright law, was highly affected by the Legal Process School of
jurisprudence, under which courts’ ability to develop new law was
restricted. 190 In the early twentieth century, courts operating under the
influence of Legal Realism enjoyed a broad freedom to shape copyright
law. But the prevailing legal philosophy by the mid-twentieth century had
changed radically. After World War II, jurists were less enamored with
the idea of unfettered judicial discretion. 191 The Legal Process School of
jurisprudence emphasized Congress as the supreme law-making
authority. 192 Judicial law-making faded somewhat into the background as
courts were increasingly confined to a role of merely elaborating the
statutory scheme put in place by Congress. If so, it is unsurprising that
judicial development of moral rights of the early twentieth century
eventually fell away.
The dominance of legislation at this time occurred not only on the
federal level, but also on the state level. After the Copyright Act came into
force, a number of states passed their own quasi-moral rights legislation.
The New York Artists Authorship Rights Act (NYAARA) was signed in
1984 and the California Art Preservation Act (CAPA) was signed in
1979. 193 These laws provided that the author of certain fine artworks
188.
189.

17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).
Jerry D. Chaney, New Copyright Law Gives Authors Little Cause for Rejoicing, 55(3)
JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY 515, 515 (1978).
190. SHAYMKRISHNA BALGANESH, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
(forthcoming 2018).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Richard H. Frallon Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 953, 958 (1994) (attributing to the Legal Process School the view that Congress was the
“principal agent of change and policy development”).
193. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.08 (2017).
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would have the right to claim authorship of the works and prevent their
modification. 194 These statutes are partly preempted by the Federal Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990. 195 Furthermore, these statutes do not
provide moral rights protection in the sense that the term is used in the
Berne Convention. The Berne Convention allows the author certain rights
in respect to the incorporeal work. 196 That is, if someone displays a
reproduction of a work, the Berne Convention would allow the author to
claim authorship (or to restrain the display if it were prejudicial to his
honor or reputation). However, the NYAARA, CAPA, and VARA laws
only apply to the corporeal work. 197 That is, if someone were to display
the original artwork without relevant credit, the author would be able to
complain, but not so if the defendant only displayed a reproduction.
Nevertheless, these laws surely contributed to the sense that moral rights
protection was essentially a matter for legislation.
The United States’ accession to the Berne Convention also
contributed to this notion that the issue of moral rights was primarily a
legislative matter. The Berne Convention Implementation Act was signed
in 1988 and enabled the United States to join the Berne Union. 198 As a
party to the Berne Convention, the United States has to comply with
article 6bis by protecting attribution and integrity interests of foreign
authors. 199 The process of Berne Convention implementation was largely
a legislative process, and this arguably had the effect of reaffirming the
idea that moral rights protection was something for Congress, not the
courts, to create.
During the accession process, the infamous “patchwork thesis” also
became a focus of debate. When assessing the American potential
compliance with article 6bis, an Ad Hoc Working Group came to the
controversial conclusion that, while U.S. law contained no explicit moral
rights provision, a “patchwork” of federal and state causes of action, from
state common law libel and privacy actions to the federal Lanham Act
provisions on unfair competition, provided sufficient protection to
attribution and integrity interests to enable the United States to join the
Berne Convention without further legislation on moral rights. 200 This
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(1), as amended,
September 28, 1979.
197. NIMMER, supra note 193.
198. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 134 Cong. Rec. S. 14549 (Oct. 5, 1988).
199. Id.
200. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
supra note 5.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/4

30

Goold: Moral Rights Invastion

2017]

MORAL RIGHTS INVASION

1123

highlights that by the mid-1980s, there were established “alternative”
routes to moral rights protection. In particular, rather than claim moral
rights protection, litigants were more likely to be successful if they
claimed a lack of appropriate attribution amounted to a false designation
of origin and reverse passing off under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
case Smith v. Montoro had paved the way for this argument. 201 Likewise,
Gilliam also held that by altering Monty Python’s work and attributing
such work to Monty Python was also a false designation of origin under
the Lanham Act as it passed off ABC’s edits as the work of Monty
Python. 202 The fact that these alternative causes of action became the locus
of moral rights protection surely limited the need for courts to develop
further a sui generis theory of moral rights protection. 203
Lastly, one should not understate the influence, and perhaps the
unintended consequences, of scholarly writing on this issue. In his famous
essay, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, John Merryman argued that
U.S. law contained no moral rights protection and was deficient in
comparison to continental law. 204 In 1976, Merryman wrote: “Crimi is one
of the few American decisions addressing the moral right question, and
its response is unequivocal: there is no moral right.” 205 But this essay
likely had a paradoxical, even perverse, impact. Merryman was a
supporter of strong moral rights protection. In his essay, Merryman,
arguably, strategically over-read Crimi and downplayed the importance
of existing American moral rights protections by giving short shrift to
decisions like Chesler, Edison, and Seroff, with the goal of proving how
deficient U.S. law was compared to the French and German. But in so
doing, he sent a strong message to the American judiciary: as currently
written, U.S. law does not protect moral rights. While Merryman intended
his essay to spur the development of a moral rights protection, telling a
precedent-minded judiciary that U.S. law unequivocally failed to protect
moral rights likely had the opposite effect, and chilled the further
development of moral rights law. Likewise, Damich started his 1988
article by recounting the stories of Vargas and Crimi, perhaps giving the
false impression that these cases were typical or representative, when they

201. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
202. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
203. It is also possible that the expansion of the derivative works right in § 106(2) of the
Copyright Act has provided plaintiffs with another powerful tool with which to address integrity
violations and, in consequence, lessened plaintiffs reliance on developing a sui generis tort of moral
rights. Thank you to Peter Karol for highlighting this point.
204. Merryman, supra note 180, at 1039.
205. Id.
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could plausibly be seen as outliers. 206 By promoting the “pure” and
romanticized version of European moral rights, arguably, these scholars
undercut the American version of the moral rights law that was still in its
infancy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Moral rights are un-American; they are something that Europeans
do, but find no purchase in the hardheaded, utilitarian, property-focused
logic of American copyright law that upholds society’s interest in a robust
public domain. This is familiar rhetoric in the debate about moral rights
in the United States today. And, while there is much truth in the sentiment,
it is—as most rhetorical arguments are—overly simplistic. While U.S.
courts did not embrace moral rights to the extent that continental jurists
did, 207 the American reception of moral rights was warmer than often
portrayed. At the height of judicial sympathy towards authorial attribution
and integrity claims, courts almost developed a unique state-law moral
rights cause of action. This story should be kept in mind today. In 2018,
the Copyright Office is examining the issue of moral rights, and in the
wake of recent judicial developments, reassessing whether American
copyright law is consistent with the Berne Convention obligations, and
whether U.S. law should adopt more explicit moral rights protections. 208
The prescription of this Article is that, while this debate is ongoing, policy
makers should forgo simplistic arguments about whether moral rights are
something alien, and antithetical, to U.S. law, and instead focus on the
normative questions at hand.

206. Damich, supra note 182, at 1–2.
207. But see Cyrril P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 353
(2006).
208. U.S. Copyright Office, Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, 82 FED.
REG. 7870 (2017).
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